THE Black Saturday bushfire royal commission resumed yesterday, continuing its investigation into the most devastating bushfire in Australia’s history.

Since beginning in March last year, the commission has announced a raft of recommendations to ensure Victorians are better equipped to deal with a catastrophic fire.

Some recommendations have already been adopted, some are in the pipeline, and others have been rejected by experts and the wider public alike.

The hard truth is, Victoria’s capacity to prevent a recurrence of Black Saturday will be put to the test.

It’s the reality of country Victoria’s volatile terrain of rising temperatures, drought conditions and human error or malice. The 7 February fire was not the first, and it certainly won’t be the last, major fire that sweeps the state.

And so the commission held 26 community consultations, received more than 1200 submissions, and examined firefighters, fire experts, academics, engineers, police officers and displaced residents to determine ways to reduce the chances of fires occurring and to prevent loss of life.

Of the 1200-plus documents submitted to the commission, three key issues were raised more than any other.

The most common topic surrounded fuel reduction. Massive fuel loads played a major role in generating a fire of unprecedented heat and speed. Reports referred to flames leaping 100m into the air, generating such heat that road signs melted.

The two other high priority issues referred to in submissions were about fire preparedness and fire warnings.

The commission identified several weaknesses with the state’s information and warning systems on Black Saturday.

According to the commission’s first interim report, released on 17 August, warnings were often delayed, meaning residents did not have as much time as they should have to respond to the fire.

The warnings that were issued were often vague and confusing, so people in danger did not have a clear idea of the proximity and severity of the fire.

Non-use of fire sirens, telecommunication system failures and poorly maintained websites were also concerns raised. The commission revealed that 80 per cent of calls to the Victorian Bushfire Information Line went unanswered.

The commission did acknowledge that Victorians had plenty of prior warning that 7 February would be “the worst day ever in the history of the state”, as Premier John Brumby warned in the days leading up to it.

Yet 173 people died - how did this happen?

It started with a faulty powerline. The commission heard that a defective powerline sparked the Kilmore East fire, which killed 119 people.

Pole 38, between Sunday Creek Rd and Saunders Rd, was identified as the culprit.

The number of people who died in their homes or in their cars after fleeing last-minute has ignited fierce debate about the stay or go policy. This policy has undergone intense scrutiny at the hearing.

The commission came to the conclusion that the risks of staying and defending had not been emphasised enough. It recommended that the CFA be given authority on determining the defendability of properties in bushfire-prone areas.

The CFA has since modified its message on the policy, adding a new “Code Red” fire danger level and recommending people leave the night before or early that morning on such a day.

The focus of the commission then went to the suitability of fire refuges – places of last resort. The commission’s view was that there was a lack of fire refuges for those whose plans had failed and need to urgently relocate.

The CFA has since identified “neighbourhood safer places” in “at-risk” Victorian locations, but none have been identified in the towns affected by Black Saturday. This has caused anxiety among several residents who have taken on board recommendations to leave early in extreme weather conditions, but don’t know where to go.